mny earnest wish to help it forward, so far as in me lies. But there may be always a fly in the amber, and a thorn in the rose; and the thorn to me has been this address. For it is a disappointment to me to feel myself unable to put before you some new and origin-al piece of work, as so many of my predecessors have done. I recall that on the very subject I have chosen, hysteria, addresses of this kind have been given you by Dr. Thomas Buzzard and Dr. Sharkey. But I am obliged to forego the ambition to be original; and, in lieu thereof, I ask your attention while I endeavour to sketch out two striking theories on the subject of hysteria-first, that of Professor Pierre Janet, of Paris; secondly, that of Dr. Breuer and Professor Freud, of Vienna. There are some of you, I know, who have already studied these theories in detail-from them I inust simply ask indulgence; there may be others whose attention has not yet been turned this way, and perhaps they may find what I have to say sufficiently novel to be interesting.
I shall not, of course, attempt to give you any history of all the theories that have been held about hysteria-interesting subject though that might be-but I shall merely remark that you may find underlying most of them two different drifts of thought, which have only within comparatively recent times become distinctly differentiated. The one JA-9 seeks to explain the disease on a physical or bodily basis, the other on a psychological. Even the old writers who held the frankly material view that hysteria was due to the wanderings of the womb round the body, like those of a lion round its cage, freely emphasized the mental peculiarities of the patient, though the term "vapours" furnished a convenient physical explanation of these also. Briquet, who led the way in the modern study of hysteria, speaks very cautiously. To him, as to many still, emotion was the key-note of the disease, but-he says " hysteria is a disease of that part of the brain which subserves the emotions." Since his time the trend has been more and more towards the psychological explanation of the disease, in spite of the gallant attempts, if I may so call them, of Dr. Bastian and of the late Dr. Savill to put it on a physical basis. Paget spoke of "neuromimesis " and of " want of will," Russell Reynolds of " paralysis from idea," Mobius declared that the disease was " ideogenous." But none of these suggestions carried us very far: first, because they failed to cover the whole ground; secondly, because a patient could have replied with perfect truth, " I make the effort of will as much as ever I did; I know nothing about the diseases you suppose me to copy; and before I was paralysed, no notion of paralysis had ever occurred to me." So the psychologists had to take a wider ground, and this they did most effectually when they included in their theory subconscious mental operations, and the notion (arising out of them) of dissociation of the personality. Since these conceptions underlie both the theories I shall deal with, something must be said, however briefly, about them first. It seems that there are two classes of mental phenomena; one which at first sight hardly seems to deserve the name mental, because it concerns facts of which we take no personal cognizance. Yet it is certain that impressions of all kinds pour in upon us from the organs of our body and from the outside world; that memories and ideas of the past are constantly -rising up within us, of which we have no personal consciousness; that they affect us, that they group and associate themselves just as do our conscious thoughts, and that under some circumstances they may emnerge into the light of consciousness, though we never before knew them to exist. These are called subconscious ideas, the workings of the subconscious mind-a phrase which is becoming dangerously popular, since we hear it nowadays from the pulpit and from the daily press. The other class consists of ordinary mental phenomena, the perceptions, feelings, and thoughts of our daily life which are known to our conscious personal selves, and whicl perhaps seem to need no further explanation. Yet what is this self, this personality, which consciously feels and thinks ? According to Janet it is the vast system of ideas which has been growing up, all our lives, by continuous perception, storage, and grouping, of mental facts into a systematic whole. Each time that a new mental fact, however simple or complicated, or the memory of an old one, is brought into relation with this system, and relegated to its place therein-assimilated (to put it shortly)-an act of consciousness takes place. Thus the personality grows, becoming daily a mnore complicated yet more individual mosaic, as the individual experiences are fitted in.
When did this process begin? What was the birth of this self? I do not know the answer of modern psychology. Aristotle, if I remember rightly, said that the soul did not enter the body till after the first years of life. And so says a modern poet:
"The baby new to earth and sky, What time his tender palm is prest Against the circle of the breast, Has never thought that ' This is I."' But another one says:
" The soul that cometh with us, our life's star, Hath had elsewhere its setting And cometh from afar." But I am digressing. We must return to the subconscious. Just as our recognized perceptions, our conscious mental states, become assimilated to the system which we call our personal self, so (it is said) may our subconscious mental states, of which we are not cognizant, group themselves into systems of their own. Indeed, this may go on to such an extent that in certain instances there may grow up a second self, independent of our known self. This process is called the dissociation of our personality. Now, though our subconscious mental life, and the secondary states that may arise therein, play a most important part in hysteria, nevertheless that which, according to Janet, is really distinctive of the disease is what he calls the restriction of the field of personal consciousness. This may be explained as follows: The normal mind can perceive-that is, take in and arrange--many things at once, whether these be-sensations, memories, or more complicated mental states, such as emotions or abstract ideas. This comprehensiveness of perception may be called the field of consciousness. The hysterical mind can take in much less. The multiple sensations are there: they reach the subconscious mind (as can be shown in various ways), but they are not assimilated to the system which is called the personal consciousness. As an example is taken hysterical restriction of the field of vision. A normal person, besides seeing the object fixed by him, is conscious of objects at the periphery, an hysterical patient very often is not. At the risk of being a little tedious, I must now try to follow out this theory through some of the symptoms of hysteria, making first this assumption, that in proportion as the field of personal consciousness diminishes, so do the subconscious mental conditions tend to flourish and abound. In this way is accounted for the prevalence and importance of these secondary states of hysteria.
It is natural to begin with some of the mental manifestations of the disease. Owing to the particular disability which has just been mentioned, the patient may become unable to combine certain memories of the past with the perceptions of the present. He then exhibits hysterical loss of memory-amnesia. Strange instances of gaps in the memory are related by Charcot, Janet, and other French authors. We hear less of them in this country; still, they occur. Thus, a girl was under my charge at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, about a year ago, with hysterical paralysis. On questioning her as to the circumstances under which it arose, I found she had entirely forgotten some months of her life at that time. Neither the girl nor her mother had said anything about this loss of memory, so it was found out by chance. Another patient, after falling off a bicycle without apparently sustaining any serious injury, did not know who he was or where he was, or even that he was married, until his wife arrived to remind him. Short of such a complete blotting out of memories, it is obvious that a person who can only bring together a limited number of ideas at once is less checked and governed by past experiences than a normal person, and thus lays herself open to the charge of fickleness and insincerity, whereas she really suffers from a species of forgetfulness. Again, since she can take no comprehensive view of facts and motives, being only able to realize them piecemeal, as it were, reasoned volition becomes replaced by impulsiveness, and she is said to .suffer from weakness of will. Further (and this seems to be of great importance), when a particular idea is placed prominently before such a patient's mind, there is lacking the restraining and modifying influence due to the simultaneous presence of other ideas and counter-experiences. Thus the one idea acquires undue importance, and tends to reign supreme over the thoughts and conduct. Hence the importance of the fixed idea in hysteria, and the power of suggestion when an idea is forced on such a patient by another person.
This untrammelled force of a single idea might very well be used as an explanation of the emotional character of such patients. It which meaningless struggles, rigidity, and opisthotonus play a large part; or the popular "fit of hysterics "-globus, followed by an emotional display, and apparently without loss of consciousness. It is rather difficult to explain these as a scene from the past, unless we suppose that the past of very various patients has been very much the same. I should like, however, to mention here an instance of the dramatic style of fit, the appearance of which made an important difference to the diagnosis of the case. A young sailor was sent into Queen Square Hospital with the following history: In the course of a gun-drill an explosion had happened, and a piece of flying metal had struck him on the head and rendered him unconscious. tJver since he had been subject to fits, characterized (we were told) by unilateral convulsions. It was peculiar, however, that the convulsions were on the same side as the injury to the head. Nothing happened in the hospital till the day when he was going out; then he had a fit (witnessed by the resident officer) in which the whole scene of the gun-drill was re-enacted. He listened for the word of the commanding officer, made the proper reply, went through the manipulations of the gun, and finally, presumably when the explosion happened, fell down unconscious. Up to that time the question had been whether he might not have some local injury to the brain, for which he ought to be trephined.
Hysterical aneesthesia, the most important of Charcot's " stigmata" of the disease, is thus explained on Janet's hypothesis of a restricted field of personal consciousness. Suppose that a patient can consciously perceive only a small number of sensations at once, it follows that he must cease to attend to some sensations, and such failure of attention may become habitual, till at last the conscious perception of them ceases entirely-i.e., he becomes aneesthetic. Whether this be the exact process or no, a psychical rather than a physical explanation of hysterical anEesthesia seems necessary. For, firstly, the distribution of such anaesthesia is not determined by anatomical conditions such as the distribution of nerves and nerve-roots or blood-vessels, but rather by the patient's own conception of his hand, arm, or leg, or whatever the ancesthetic part may be. Secondly, the anaesthesia is physically unreal.
Even in cases where it is most intense (nay, perhaps most easily in wjh cases), it can often be shown that sensations still reach the patient; that he feels though he thinks that he does not feel. Thirdly, the discovery of the anaesthesia often comes to him as a surprise, he did not know of it before he was medically examined. On the strength of this last fact, indeed, Babinski maintains that the aneesthesia is the result of suggestion, put there, in point of fact, by the physician. This may be true for some cases, but certainly not for all, nor even, I think, for most cases. Now anaesthesia, which we commonly regard in the light of its geographical distribution over the body, really leads up to a more difficult and general question. This lack of personal perception mnay be "systematized." This is best seen perhaps in amnesia or forgetfulness, which is really only aneesthesia to perceptions of the past, an inability to revive them in consciousness. Such forgetfulness may centre round a particular event or a particular person; everything else is remembered, but all connected with that event or person is forgotten. There may be similar gaps in the perception of present things. Perhaps this is most often seen in artificial hypnosis; the hypnotized subject hears and obeys the voice of the charmer, but not that of others, and he can be rendered blind to a particular object while he sees everything else. Still, the same sort of thing occurs in hysterical somnambulism. But it is added (and this gives to the theory a very general significance) hysterical disabilities may centre not merely around this or that person, or thing, or district of the body, but also around particular bodily functions. We must consider here for a moment what a particular bodily function means. To the physiologist it is an organized grouping of physical events, muscular contractions, secretion of cells, reception, transmission, and arrangement of nervous impulses, and so forth. Some of these groups, let us say those of cardiac action, or respiratory movements, are so thoroughly organized that they seem to be completely automatic, and to have no mental correlation. Doubtless they once had, perhaps they still have, but at any rate it is unimportant. But it is quite otherwise with less organized functtions, such as speech, writing, vision, hearing, &c. In correspondence with these, which are being continually developed to meet the continuous demand of new circumstances in which they have to be exercised, there is a vast amount of psychological construction still going on. Mental facts of all kinds connected with their exercise, sensations, volitions, emotions, memories, &c., are being built up into a system corresponding to the function, into the idea of it, if you like. This is the function from the physiologist's point of view, and upon this, according to Janet, the hysterical ban may fall.
This digression was necessary before we consider the explanation of hysterical motor paralysis. There may be several varieties of this. A patient may lose all sensation in a limb, including the sense of position; in such a case she can only move the limb when she looks at it (Lasegue's phenomenon). If, in addition, she has lost the memories of movement, she will be unable to move it all. There was a child in Queen Square Hospital lately who, after some acute illness, had hysterical paraplegia. When asked what had caused the paralysis, she replied, with perfect truth, "I was in bed too long." She had forgotten the use of her legs.
Again, paralysis may be due, as has been said, to idea. The patient has adopted a disabling suggestion that she cannot, or ought not, to move, and forthwith she becomes unable to do so. The idea may be subconscious, the patient not knowing of its existence, or of the relation of the paralysis to it. Lastly, there remains the condition where paralysis seems to affect a function rather than a particular part of the body. The grasp of the patient's consciousness is so limited that she cannot make the combination of mental activities requisite for the exercise of a particular function. The condition called in France astasia-abasia is an example of this. The muscles of the legs are strong, the reflexes normal: there is no anesthesia, the movements of the legs when lying down or sitting are perfect. Only, the patient can neither walk nor stand. She is paralysed for those actions, and for those only. Nay, the specialization may go further. I remember a lady who could walk quite well in the house, but who could only walk out of doors when she knew some one was by her side. If some one did, she could walk quite well and without support. In such a case the structures necessary for the function are sound-nay, the function itself can be performed, but only under special circumstances. It will be said that is mere nervousness; but then what do we mean by nervousness ' 2
The idea of a function as a kind of nervous entity is pushed farther (perhaps you will think too far) to explain certain motor disturbances which are characterized by agitation rather than paralysis. Thus, as mutism is the paralysis of speech, so (it is said) there is a condition of logorrhoea, a deluge of inconsequent talk, in which speech seems to have freed itself from personal control, and exercises itself automatically. It is hinted that hysterical chorea and involuntary movements may sometimes be of this character. But probably most of these latter are due to a fixed idea. Janet gives this instance: A man ever since an attack of typhoid had the habit of making an odd grimace ending with a noisy expiration through one nostril. This was due to the unconscious idea that he had a caked secretion in that nostril, as indeed he had had at one time. He was cured by a counter-suggestion. I may remark en passant that ideas seem readily to fix themselves on the nose. A governess used to come to the out-patient room at Queen Square Hospital complaining of " nervousness " which she said had lost her several situations. One day, finding me alone, she told me what the nervousness was. She said, " Can you tell me whether there is a passage from the eye to the nose, big enough to get my little finger down ? I can't get rid of the idea that there ought to be." I drew her a diagram of the lachrymal duct, enlarging the size a little to meet her requirements, and she went away saying, " Thank you so much; now I feel that I shall be much better." But I never heard whether she was.
I shall only touch on one more out of the long gamut of hysterical symptoms--namely, localized pain, and, what is still commoner, localized tenderness. These symptoms, apparently physical, are to the psychologist expressions of a fixed idea, generally subconscious,. and often connected with the shock that first called the hysteria into active existence. Examples (1) A man' hurt his shoulder in a lift accident. Long after the injury was cured there remained a tender point; when this point was touched he had spasms in the shoulder muscles, a feeling of terror, and a sense of suffocation.
(2) A woman came to Queen Square for trigeminal neuralgia. An operation for the removal of the ganglion had been already performed; a second, and finally a third, one was performed. Thus the surgical treatment was certainly sufficiently complete, yet relief was only temporary; the local pains returned, and with them she developed a peculiar mental state and a left hemianasthesia, undoubtedly hysterical. It was curious to see in the same patient an hysterical hemianaesthesia and an organic aneesthesia in the district of the trigeminus.
(3) A girl2 had shiverings and horrible feelings whenever her right side was touched. For this she could give no reason, but finally she had an attack of somnambulism, during which it was ascertained that she had once had a dream in which she fancied that a man lay by her right side and attempted to assault her.
So in these three cases the fixed idea originated from an injury, from previous disease, and from a dream respectively.
How does hysteria, then, differ from the allied complaint commonly called neurasthenia, or, more properly, psychasthenia, in which also fixed ideas play so large a part ? The psychasthenic does not suffer from the disability characteristic of hysteria-i.e., the inability to bring within range of his personal consciousness more than a few facts at once. Hence he retains the appreciation of his fixed idea, along with that of his personal life. It has not dropped completely into his subconsciousness. Thus it is more under his cognizance and control, but it torments him more. The hysterical patient, on the other hand, is liable to alternations of mental state-one, the paroxysm, in which his personal consciousness is in abeyance, and the fixed idea, unchecked by realities, holds complete sway; the other (the interparoxysmal state), in which he is unconscious of the fixed idea, which nevertheless may be there, and producing some paralysis or other permanent symptom. An elaborate comparison and contrast between-the symptoms of hysteria and psychasthenia are given by Janet in his book on the neuroses.
How does the hysterical state differ from that of hypnosis ? The 'From Janet, " Les n6vroses," Paris, 1909, p. 171. answer is that there is no essential difference. Hypnotism is somnambulism artificially produced; and the peculiar relation of the subject to the hypnotizer is produced solely by the gradual introduction into the patient's mind of the idea of the operator's personality; and this, like other fixed ideas, soon comes to dominate his whole mental state. That hypnosis is at bottom hysterical is shown by several facts, such as (1) the similarity of symptoms; (2) that the remembrances of previous hysterical states can be revived in hypnosis; (3) that none but hysterical subjects are hypnotizable. But this last statement is certainly not admitted by all authorities. I must now turn to the theories of the other two authors I proposed to discuss-Breuer and Freud. It seems that their earlier papers were written conjointly, and are more concerned with the explanation of certain hysterical phenomena than with an exposition of the essence of the disease. On this latter point Freud has given his views in later papers more fully. Their theories are closely connected with, one might almost say founded upon, a special method of treatment. Starting with the facts of traumatic hysteria, as described by Charcot, they regard hysteria in general as a kind of psychical trauma. The patient receives some mental shock which, instead of passing off by degrees, remains buried in his consciousness, or, rather, subconsciousness, as a foreign body might remain in a wound, and constituting a permanent source of irritation, which is manifested by hysterical synmptoms. The treatment. to carry their own metaphor a little further, may be compared to opening up the wound and removing the foreign body. Leaving metaphor, the broad outline of the theory is as follows: Every event that appeals to our emotions, and particularly to painful emotions, such as fear, anger, sorrow, &c., raises in the mind a disturbance, stress, and strain, which they call the " affect"; this latter generally finds an appropriate outlet, as in an act of retaliation, or, perhaps, merely in tears or language; this lrocess they call " abreagirung." In English we speak of giving vent to pent-up feelings, or, in common parlance, of "working them off" or "blowing off steam." But whatever name be used, the fact is well known that by outward expression of the feeling the mental tension is relieved.
"Home they brought hew warrior dead.
She nor swooned nor uttered cry; All her maidens, watching, said, ' She must weep or she will die.'
Only according to Breuer and Freud she will not die, but become hysterical. But how or why should she ? If her distress expended itself in tears, the next time that scene recurred to her, the mental tension would be less, probably she would weep again, and that again, as the saying goes, would do her good; till finally the memory would become sad, no doubt, but bearable-" the idea would be shorn of its affect." That is one principle, that complete and appropriate expression of feeling robs the idea of its emotional effect. But if she cannot weep, what then ? Either the course of time, the wear and tear of her future life, the calmer feelings that she can bring to bear upon that memory, or perhaps some skilfully-contrived counter-association, like that contrived by the nurse who "slipped her child upon her knee," will gradually bring relief; or else a process may take place which Breuer and Freud call " conversion of the affect,' and which they regard as lying at the root of most hysterical symptoms. This is as follows: The unbearable memory cannot be annulled; but the patient banishes it from consciousness. That is, however, a pis-aller. " Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret." For the idea remains in the lower strata of the mind, the subconsciousness, whence it crops up from time to time, like a submerged rock at low tides, unrecognized, it is true, by the patient, but yet producing the same mental distress as at first. This distress inust be relieved, and it is relieved by providing some physical and bodily occurrence to take its place. How this can be done we do not know, but assuming that it can be done, that such a substitution of physical for mental can be made, it is obvious that the act will grow easier with repetition, till finally it becomes automatic. So now the patient, having banished the original idea from his mind and substituted a symptom for the mental " affect," may know nothing of the meaning of this symptom, which to him and to his friends appears to be a new disease, instead of being the effect of an old memory.
The process then involves two steps. idea is never present to the consciousness at all. It has arisen while the patient was in a peculiar frame of mind, which they call a " hypnoid state." The hypnoid state is a sort of absent-mindedness-not, indeed, the absent-nindedness which is produced by active concentration of thought, as in the solution of a. problem or the following out of some difficult train of reasoning, but rather a kind of day-dream wherein the thoughts are unaffected by the present or past events of real life, and are unchecked by self-criticism. To be sure, we cannot call everyone who indulges in reveries or builds pleasant castles in the air mentally abnormal, but there is just the risk that something pathological may develop out of this-viz., the leading of a second imaginary life apart from his own, the beginnings of a. dissociation in his personality. In this pathological state ideas may develop which remain out of all relation to the current of his normal ideas, and finally establish themselves as hysterical fixed ideas, the sinister results of which we have already seen-. Now the soil on which such hypnoid states grow seems to be mental isolation amid depressing circumstances or remembrances, such as the atmosphere of the sick-chamber of some dear relation, the brooding over misfortunes or injustice-in short, " chewing the cud of melancholy." One emotion, indeed-namely, terror-is credited with producing such a state suddenly and at once. Even animals may be fascinated with fear. Most of us could give instances. I remember one which impressed me much in my boyhood. In those days there was a single railway line between Norwich and Yarmouth. Upon this line, near Norwich, two trains going in opposite directions collided, with very terrible results. A certain person of whom I had often heard was in the rear of the train going towards Norwich. He was not injured, but walked at once (so I heard) past the scene of the accident into Norwich, where he said nothing of what happened, and afterwards, when questioned, said he did not know there had been an accident. Of course kindly critics said that he had neglected the duty of giving help, that he was a coward, and also a liar. But I suppose he was so profoundly affected that he really did not know. What happened to him afterwards I never heard, but there were all the materials ready for a. traumatic hysteria.
These, then, are the two principal ways in which, according to these authors, hysteria may originate-either as a defence-neurosis where the idea has been forcibly relegated to the subconsciousness, or as a hypnoid hysteria when it has always been there. A third possibility seems to be that the idea may not be banished, but that, through want of a proper vent to the emotional disturbance it sets up, hysteria develops. This would be, I suppose, what they call a simple " retention-hysteria."
But neither of them lays much stress on this, and indeed Freud 'seems to think that the first-named process-namely, the defence hysteria-is the only one of capital interest.
I ought perhaps to say something here about Freud's method of treating hysteria, called " psycho-analysis," which professes, as I understand, to be not merely a method of treatment, but also the-means of eliciting facts on which the theory is based. The principle of it, as I have already said, is to bring the troublesome idea into the light of personal consciousness, and to allow the mental distress which it then produces to have a complete vent, say in tears or in speech; and when this is done the hysterical symptoms (it is averred) will disappear. The idea, being the forgotten memory of some past event, or scene, or feeling, can only be discovered by gradually directing the patient's thoughts into such channels as may lead back to it, and it goes without saying that this may be a most difficult, delicate, and, I should iinagine, unsatisfactory process. The original practice was to hypnotize the patient. But this, owing to the difficulties presented by many patients, was abandoned; and instead of it the patient was placed in a recumbent position, with the eyes closed, and told to concentrate her attention on the memories of her past life. If appropriate memories refused to come, pressure was made by the physician's hand on the patient's head, coupled with the assurances that such memories must and will come. The process of directing them and eliciting them was carried on until the crucial memory was reached. Nay, more, they might have to be forced upon the patient (this is Freud's own expression) because the revival of them is disagreeable just in proportion to the original effort made to banish them. As may easily be imagined, the pressure on the head has in turn been given up; and I understand that the method now employed is as follows (I quote from Brill's preface to a translation of some of Freud's papers): embarrassment or mortification. On listening to such a history one invariably notices many memory gaps, both in reference to time and causal relations. These the patient is urged to fill in by concentration of attention on the subject in question, and by repeating all the unintentional thoughts originating in this connexion. This is the so-called method of free association. The patient is required to relate all his thoughts in the order of their sequence, even if they seem irrelevant to him. He must do away with all critique and remain perfectly passive. It is in this way that we fathom the original meaning of his symptoms. But as the thoughts which originate in this way are of a disagreeable and painful nature, they are pushed back with the greatest resistance. This is further enhanced by the fact that the hysterical symptom is the symbolic expression of the realization of a repressed wish, and serves as a gratification for the patient. He strives very hard, unconsciously of course, to retain the symptom, as it is the only thing left to him from his former unattainable conscious wishings and strivings. The object of the psycho-analytic treatment is to overcome all these resistances and to reconduct to the patient's consciousness the thoughts underlying the symptoms. Here lies the greatest difficulty; for, just as in the normal life and the dream, a psycho-neurotic symptom is merely a symbolic or cryptic expression of the original repressed thoughts. . . To discover the hidden mechanism one must make use of the author's developed method of interpretation; that is, one must look for symbolic action, lapses in speech, memory, &c., and, above all, one must resort to the analysis of dreams, as they give the most direct access to the unconscious."
It remains to notice these later developments of Freud's theories, which are of the highest importance, if true. Concerning these I must be very brief. What is the nature of the tormenting ideas which the patient has repressed, and whose emotional " affect " has been " converted " into hysterical symptoms? The answer is that they are always of a sexual nature. The ground of this assertion seems mainly to be that in all hysterical cases which Freud has submitted to his process of psycho-analysis he has found this to be the case, having traced the hysterical symptoms back to some disagreeable occurrence, thoughts, or feelings in the sexual sphere. But of the authors of these theories. I have not lived among hysterical patients, as Professor Janet appears to have done at the Salpetriere, nor conducted, as he has done, the subtle analysis of their minds under hypnosis. Nor can I profess to be an adept in the method of " psychoanalysis" as practised by Breuer and Freud. So that any criticism I may make must be of a commonplace rather than of an esoteric kind. To my mind a purely mental theory of hysteria is not altogether satisfactory. The physical phenomena of disease seem to require physical antecedents. If it be said that there is no more difficulty in referring the symptoms of hysteria to mental action than there is in so referring the common voluntary actions of our daily life, I must reply that, with some exceptional symptoms of the disease, there really is such a difficulty. I mean those symptoms which are usually classed as " trophic " or "vasomotor," such as muscular wasting, oedema, haemorrhage, and perhaps some others. Either we must deny the existence of such symptoms, as Babinski does, or we must suppose that "mind " has much more influence over " body " than most of us would admit; or we must take refuge in our ignorance of the relations between mind and matter, and suppose that hysteria occupies a ground where these two empires meet. Still, in spite of all this, I quite admit the force of what Professor Janet says-namely, that, considering our utter ignorance of the nervous actions which underlie mental phenomena, it may be best to speak of hysteria in terms of mind, and investigate it from the side of laws of mind about which we do know something, remembering and hoping that some day the physical revelation may come as well. Perhaps, then, a mental theory of hysteria promises best for the present. I have already indicated that this kind of theory did not get far until it adopted among its postulates the subconscious workings of the mind. About the existence of these there can be little doubt; but in such a realm both individual facts and general laws are very difficult to ascertain with certainty. They may be the best material we can get for a theory, but they are very unsubstantial, and literally " such stuff as dreams are made of."
What shall we say of Professor Janet's view, that the psychological " stigma" of hysteria, the essence of the disease, is a restriction of the field of personal consciousness ? This explains in a very admirable manner some well-known features of the disease-e.g., contraction of the visual field of vision, anaesthesia, and amnesia. To extend it to sundry other features requires, I think, all this distinguished author's ingenuity.
One would have thought, too, that there would be some independent evidence of the existence of such a disability; that some of the patients, at any rate, would have recognized it for themselves; and one might urge (as do Breuer and Freud) that many hysterical patients seem to suffer from no mental disability at all.
The theories of Breuer and Freud start, at any rate, with a wellestablished fact of human nature-namely, the relief that is experienced by giving vent to pent-up mental distress. Yet I suspect they rate the power of the confessional too high. Can we suppose that every severe and ingrained hysterical symptom would be cured in this way? About the so-called process of " conversion," which is really one of the keystones of their theory, one would like some independent proof. Is there really evidence to show that hysterical patients possess a peculiar faculty whereby they can substitute a bodily symptom for mental distress ? There is the same lack of evidence for the statement that hysteria originates in forcible repression of a distressing idea; and still more to the statement that the ideas at the bottom of hysteria are always of a sexual nature. We may grant that sexual ideas form a most important part of our subconscious mental state, and that the mental and physical manifestations of them are bound up together in the most remarkable way; but that does not prove that they are the basis, as Freud asserts, of all hysteria, indeed of all neuroses. The very example with which his theory started-namely, traumatic hysteria-proves the contrarv. I know the answer made-viz., that the proof of these statements lies in the so-called facts of psycho-analysis. But can we implicitly rely on the dreamy imaginings of a patient undergoing that process ? Is it not very probable that we may put into his mind just what we want to find there ? We know that Freud gave up that portion of his theory which relates to sexual assaults because he found that his patients had misled him. And if the master of this method may be deceived, how much more his disciples? To this I cannot help adding, that psycho-analysis, if it is to mean the resurrection of buried sexual ideas, might to many patients do much more harm than good. The proof of the pudding, we are reminded, lies in the eating; but the dish is a little unsavoury, and I cannot help hoping that the taste for it will not become very general.
These are the bare outlines of criticisms which I think might be elaborated so as to obtain some force. But I feel, gentlemen, that I have tried your patience long enough; I shall return, therefore, to that with which I started; and once more thank you for the honour you have done me, and, this time also, for the kind attention with which you have heard me.
